Triangle of Coherence

For some time now Pascal Lamy has been propagating his idea of ‘the Triangle of Coherence’ in Global Governance.  At a time when Lamy’s term at helm of the WTO is about to end this might well be the sound bite legacy he leaves the WTO with. A fairly broad governance model, it describes a global institutional triumvirate of the UN, the G20 and International Organizations (such as the WTO). Lamy has used this model often to enhance the notion of a need for a stronger global structure of cooperation and coordination in the various global scenarios.

Whether it be as a solution for bringing some form of coherence to a confusing global structure, especially in a ‘post economic downturn’ world (Warwick 2009), or as a counter to economic recession and global environmental problems through a strong global governance network (New Delhi 2009), Lamy’s ‘Triangle of Coherence’ seems to be ever present. It must be noted however, that although Lamy mentions the triangle when in need of a model of a coherent global institutional nexus, he does not always mention the need FOR the model. Rather he stresses on the eventuality of it. In other words, whether we like it or not, according to Lamy we are heading for such a structure.

Frankly, it is not a bad model of global governance. What it states is that the inherent characteristics of good governance are leadership, legitimacy and efficiency. In the ‘Triangle of Coherence’ these are provided by the G20 (Leadership), the UN (Legitimacy) and international institutions such as the WTO (Efficiency through expert knowledge). At the UN General Assembly in 2011, Lamy argued that there really isn’t any alternative to ‘Globalizations’ other than ‘Better Globalization’ and refers to his triangle as a policy model in that general direction. However there are certain flaws – perhaps not with his model itself, but with the institutions designated to perform the three requirements of governance.

Let us first look at the idea of the G20 performing the role of the leader. Lamy recognizes the G20 to be more ‘inclusive’ and ‘representative’ than the G8 and therefore ‘much more legitimate’. However, by discussing the comparative legitimacy of the leadership of the G20 over the G8, Lamy has inadvertently acknowledged legitimacy to be an issue indeed. One must recognize that this is only a comparative improvement of the ‘legitimacy of a leader’ in global governance. The question will always be asked – what right does a group of 20 nations have to dictate the policy direction of a globalized planet of over 200 sovereign states? Should economic supremacy be the sole criteria for global leadership?

The reality is that even though economic supremacy may not be the most efficient or the most authentic choice of leadership, it is certainly a more coherent one. It is perhaps in the same spectrum of humanity’s psyche as the determination of individual success through a measure of wealth or power. In such circumstances, for want of a better system of determination this may remain a current solution.

Moreover by Lamy’s own admission “leadership at the international level is collective. Replacing the G8 with the G20, which is more inclusive and representative, was an important step, even though the G20 does not decide. It is not a world government, but it gives signals, impulses that matter for us all” (UN 2011). In other words the work of a global leader is not a coerced determination of world policy but rather guidance through suggestive cooperation (although the practicality of this statement is subject to debate).

In terms of Legitimacy, one is to look towards the UN, with its 193 sovereign members, to legitimize the leadership of the G20.  Although there is the potential for academic argument on whether the UN should legitimize the leadership of the G20, the commercial reality is they probably already are, whether bullied by the more influential nations or not. Ironically, this also dilutes the legitimacy of the UN, whether as a legitimizing tool for the leadership of the G20 or as a leader itself. The ability (and the image) of the UN being able to take decisions of World policy is heavily influenced by the interests of the more powerful nations. One merely has to look towards the Iraq war or even more recently the UN resolution in Sri Lanka’s Human Rights violations, to understand this dynamic. Moreover, the veto itself is an outdated post war hangover, indifferent to modern day economic reality. Nonetheless, it would be difficult to deny the UN its place as an international body, unique even just by its membership numbers.

Lastly, Lamy looks at international organizations for providing efficiency through expert knowledge. One is able to see the logic behind this allocation of responsibility, as the experts of a subject area would in all likelihood be at an organization pertaining to that subject – trade experts in trade organizations, environmentalists at an environmental organization, and so on and so forth. However, what of the times when there is an overlap of subjects? The WTO itself has often been accused of compromising dire environmental needs and turning a blind eye to human rights violations for the sake of trade. The recent CITES conference illustrated the fact that even in environmental organizations the original mandate of protection can be severely diluted by trade interests (Look out for my April article on the CITES conference in Kindle Magazine India).

Moreover, if international organizations are to perform the role of experts in their fields they must listen to experts outside the organization, such as NGOs and private interest groups (something the WTO must do at a more regular basis), and involve them more in policy and decision making processes. As Lamy rightly identifies, “the challenge of global governance today is also about “networking” institutions in a better way in order to align the global governance structure that emerged from WWII with today’s growing interdependence” (UN 2011).

A common theme throughout recent speeches has been a fear of ‘de-globalization’ (see the introductory post to this blog). It is perhaps this fear that has led to recent effort to reinvigorate the drive for multilateralism. Yet as Lamy correctly identifies, the true salvation of multilateralism lies in ‘localizing global issues’ (Oxford Matin, UK 2012) and avoiding ‘remote global governance’ (Bilkent University, Turkey 2013). However, such a sense of belonging, of community, of solidarity, based on common values does not yet exist on a global scale. (UN 2011)